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BIFURCATION OF LIABILITY AND
DAMAGES IN RULE 23(b)(3) CLASS
ACTIONS: HISTORY, POLICY,
PROBLEMS, AND A SOLUTION
by Susan E. Abitanta
OTH the class action' and bifurcation 2 emerged from equity3 as
devices to dispose expeditiously of issues in complex litigation.
When law and equity merged in 1938, the new Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure introduced the bifurcating device in rule 42(b). 4 Under
rule 42(b) courts may order separate trials of any claims or issues within
the action before them. In 1966, amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure also revised rule 23. 5 In addition to enunciating prerequisites
for class certification, the rule now includes a bifurcating device peculiar to
class actions in rule 23(c)(4)(A). 6
Bifurcation has historically served to permit courts to conserve judicial
resources and to manage complex litigation. As applied in class actions,
bifurcation has evolved into a restructuring tool available to the courts in
determining class certification. By advancing the inquiry into separate ad-
judication of liability and damage issues to the certification stage, courts
are able to approach the question of the suitability of class status with an
1. Equity defined a class action as follows: "When the question is one of common or
general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable
to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole." Equity
Rule 38 (1911).
2. Bifurcation is the division or splitting of the whole into separate branches or com-
partments. WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 83 (19th ed. 1971). As
used in this Comment, bifurcation is the use of separate trials for the separate issues of
liability and damages.
3. See Equity Rule 29 (1911) (allowing separate hearings on issues).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b). Rule 42(b) originally provided in part: "The court in fur-
therance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-
claim, counterclaim, or third party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of
claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third party claims, or issues." Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b)
(1958). In 1966 an amendment added the phrase "or when separate trials will be conducive
to expedition and economy" following the word "prejudice." FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
6. Id. The text of rule 23(c)(4)(A) provides: "(4) When appropriate (A) an action may
be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues... ." Id.
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enlightened view of the practicalities involved in effective class
adjudication.
Focusing on the separate adjudication of liability and damage issues,
this Comment traces the history of the bifurcating device and its applica-
tion in complex litigation. The use of the bifurcating device to satisfy pre-
requisites to class certification under rule 23(b)(3) is explored, and
particular attention is given to the viewpoints of proponents and oppo-
nents to the use of bifurcation as a discretionary device. Finally, this Com-
ment examines alternatives to burdensome damage calculations and
proposes a judicially manageable solution.
I. HISTORICAL USE OF BIFURCATION IN THE SEPARATE ADJUDICATION
OF LIABILITY AND DAMAGES
Arising from the equity proceeding of separate hearings under Equity
Rule 29,7 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) 8 allows the courts to order
a separate trial of certain claims and issues when a single trial would be
cumbersome, confusing, or unfair to the parties. 9 The rule provides the
trial judge with broad discretion to use the separate trial device' 0 "in fur-
therance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will
be conducive to expedition and economy."' l The federal courts have re-
lied upon the grant of power in rule 42(b) to effect a bifurcation of liability
and damage issues in a variety of substantive contexts.' 2 Proponents of
bifurcation suggest that considerations of judicial economy, efficient dispo-
sition of cases, simplification of complex issues, and procedural conven-
ience support a separate adjudication of the liability and damage claims.13
Opponents argue that the potential unfairness to the litigants outweighs
any benefits that the device may produce, 14 particularly when the issues of
7. See supra note 3.
8. See supra note 4 for text of the rule.
9. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2387, at
277 (1971 & Supp. 1982); Note, Separate Trial of a Claim or Issue in Modern Pleading.- Rule
42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 MINN. L. REV. 743, 744 (1955).
10. See Bowie v. Sorrell, 209 F.2d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1953) (within judge's sound discretion
to grant separate trials); Grissom v. Union Pac. R.R., 14 F.R.D. 263, 264 (D. Colo. 1953)
(rule 42(b) separate trial exercised in discretion of judge); see also Miner, Court Congestion:
4 NewApproach, 45 A.B.A. J. 1265, 1268 (1959); Note, supra note 9, at 744.
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b). Separation of issues is especially favored if it will result in
the avoidance of prejudice and the promotion of convenience, fairness, and speedy trial.
Miner, supra note 10, at 1268; see Chapman v. United States, 169 F.2d 641 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 860 (1948).
12. See generally 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2390, at 297 n.49 (citing
cases in antitrust, patent, personal injury, and property damage law that allowed separate
trials of liability and damage).
13. See Miner, supra note 10, at 1268. Judge Miner's enumerated reasons included:
simplification of the jury's task; the reduction of the court's docket when the defendant is
found not liable; inducement for the defendant to settle if found liable; elimination of "nui-
sance" cases that have tenuous liability claims; discouragement of dilatory tactics; encour-
agement of more efficient attorney preparation; absolution; and reduction of expense to both
parties. Id.; see also Note, supra note 9, at 745-55.
14. See Moss v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1965). The court ques-
tioned the employment of bifurcated trials in personal injury cases. The court stated:
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liability and damages are inextricably interwoven.' 5
When liability and damage issues are separable, bifurcation has gener-
ally been accepted in the litigation of complex cases.' 6 In In re Texas City
Disaster Litigation17 the court consolidated 273 suits on the issue of the
United States' liability following a disaster that occurred in April 1947.
When two steamships loaded with government manufactured fertilizer ex-
ploded in the Texas City Harbor, the ensuing fires and explosions resulted
in 560 deaths, many other personal injuries, and extensive property dam-
age. The court's finding, in the consolidated action, that the United States
was not liable obviated a determination of damages for 8,485 plaintiffs on
individualized injury claims.' 8 This case illustrates the economic benefits
achieved through bifurcation. 19 One study has revealed that trials with
bifurcated liability and damage issues consume twenty percent less time
than traditional single trials.20 As a practical matter, disposition of the
liability issue often leads to the disposition of the entire case.2'
Despite the economic benefits that bifurcation produces, one opponent
of the device suggests that separation of liability from damages has a prej-
Some look upon the practice as but another procedural "gimmick" designed
to assist current judicial efforts to mass produce dispositions of pending cases,
but which merely multiplies the burdens of litigation. They feel that the occa-
sional good it produces is greatly outweighed by the danger of unfairness be-
ing visited upon litigants who from right motives prefer to try their suits in the
traditional fashion.
Id. at 25. Although the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure include a provision comparable to
rule 42(b), the Texas Supreme Court in applying TEX. R. Civ. P. 174(b) refused to sever
liability from the issue of damages in a personal injury suit because the court found the
issues inseparable. iley v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 367, 311 S.W.2d 648, 651 (1958). Com-
mentators have disagreed on the advisability of bifurcating liability and damages in per-
sonal injury suits. Compare Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials. An
Example of the Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. Rnv. 831 (1961) (op-
posing separate adjudication of liability and damages) with Miner, supra note 10, at 1334
(insisting bifurcation proper).
15. See, e.g., C.W. Regan, Inc. v. Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade & Douglas, 411 F.2d
1379 (4th Cir. 1969); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 286 F.2d 302 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 924 (1961); McClain v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 10 F.R.D. 261 (D. Mo. 1950). See
generally 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2390, at 298 (separation of liability and
damages).
16. See Nettles v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 234 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.
1956); Hassett v. Modern Maid Packers, Inc., 23 F.R.D. 661 (D. Md. 1959); Chudyk v. 5th
Ave. Coach Line, Inc., 6 A.D.2d 1003, 177 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1958); see also Weinstein, supra
note 14, at 840-41.
17. 197 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1952), afdsub nom. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15
(1953). Plaintiffs brought this action under the Federal Torts Claim Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat.
933 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976)). Under the Act no right to jury
trial attaches. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976).
18. See Weinstein, supra note 14, at 840; Note, supra note 11, at 760.
19. For an additional example of the economic benefit produced by bifurcation, see
Rickenbacker Transp., Inc. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 3 F.R.D. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). By finding
for the defendant on the liability issue first, the court avoided damage proof from 35 con-
signors nationwide whose property was destroyed when defendant's train collided with
plaintiffs truck. Id. at 202-03.
20. Zeisel & Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A StatisticalAnalysis, 76 HRv. L.
REv. 1606, 1619 (1963).
21. See Note, supra note 9, at 755.
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udicial impact on the rights of the parties.22 For example, while defend-
ants prevail in forty-two percent of traditional personal injury trials, they
have a seventy-nine percent success rate when the issue of liability is tried
alone.23 Commentators attribute this phenomenon to the fact that the ex-
tent of a plaintiff's injuries influences a jury's identification with and sym-
pathy for the plaintiff in the determination of liability.24 The potential
impact of bifurcation upon a party's legal rights has prompted another
commentator to caution that bifurcation could effect a significant change
in the relative position of the parties, and as such it can not be viewed
solely from the standpoint of procedural efficiency. 25
In addition to the possibility that bifurcation may effect an imbalance in
the relative positions of the parties, bifurcation may jeopardize a litigant's
right to a jury trial26 under the seventh amendment to the Constitution.27
The preferred practice, which entails hearing issues separately before the
same jury,28 does not violate the command of the seventh amendment. 29
The use of separate juries presents a more difficult question.30 In United
Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner3' the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of California ordered consolidation of twenty-three suits that
the heirs and personal representatives of the victims of a 1958 mid-air col-
lision had brought against the United States and United Air Lines.32 The
court ordered a bifurcated trial with separate juries on the issues of liabil-
ity and damages.33 On appeal by the defendant airline, the Ninth Circuit
reversed and held that the liability and damage issues were so tightly inter-
woven that separate juries would be confused, thus depriving the defend-
22. See Weinstein, supra note 14, at 831-32.
23. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2390, at 299 n.56.
24. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2390, at 299; Note, supra note 9, at
761. The author of the Note concludes that the single trial system may be preferable in
personal injury litigation because the jury views liability quantitatively as well as qualita-
tively. Id. One court, however, expressed satisfaction with the efficiency that bifurcation
produces, and at the same time pointed approvingly to the elimination ofjury sympathy and
prejudice in separate liability trials. O'Donnell v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 183 F. Supp.
577, 581 (N.D. Il. 1960).
25. Weinstein, supra note 14, at 832.
26. Id. at 845.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. VII, which provides: "In Suits at common law. .. the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved...."
28. See O'Donnell v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 183 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Ml1. 1960). The
court noted that submitting the split damage and liability issues to the same jury was the
preferred practice and the more expeditious and economical procedure. Id. at 580.
29. See Moss v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 23, 27 (6th Cir. 1965); Hosie v. Chi-
cago & N.W. Ry., 282 F.2d 639,643 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); Bvocik
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 277 F. Supp. 210, 211 (E.D. Wis, 1967).
30. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 286 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1961) (refusing to
answer the more difficult question of separate juries); FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) advisory com-
mittee note (noting potential problems with separating issues in jury trials); Weinstein, supra
note 14, at 848-49 (enumerating double efforts necessary for separate juries, ie., two voir
dire examinations).
31. 286 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1961).
32. Id. at 303. The collision occurred between an aircraft owned and operated by the
United States and a passenger plane owned by United Air Lines. Id.
33. Id. at 302. The district court's order for consolidation provided the defendant an
option to appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). 286 F.2d at 304.
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ants of a fair trial.34
One commentary, analogizing to the use of partial new trials, has indi-
cated that the use of separate juries would be constitutional, 35 as long as
the issues are separable.36 Despite Weiner, early seventh amendment ob-
jections primarily focused on the prejudice to the plaintiff, who is unable
to bring his proof of injury before a sympathetic jury during the liability
phase of the trial.37 In the context of class actions the focus has shifted to
the unfairness to the defendant. The main argument is that defendants
have a right to confront each plaintiff before a single jury on the issue of
individual damages.38
II. THE 1966 AMENDMENTS TO RULE 23: AN INTRODUCTION
OF RULE 23(c)(4)(A)
Prior to the 1966 amendments courts had refused to certify proposed
classes when diverse claimants appeared to lack the necessary common
interests to justify class adjudication. 39 In the leading case of Hansberry v.
Lee4° the Supreme Court held that landowners who were seeking to secure
the benefits of a racially restrictive convenant could not bind within the
same class those challenging the validity of the convenant.4' Without the
bifurcating tool of rule 23(c)(4) Hansberry severely restricted the viability
of class actions prior to the 1966 amendments.42
Recognizing the need to fulfill the policy purposes of class actions, in-
cluding assuring access to the courts, providing a forum for the grievances
of many small claimants, promoting efficiency through group adjudication,
and deterring wrongdoing of large corporate entities, 43 the drafters of the
1966 amendments added section (c)(4)(A) to rule 23.44 This section allows'
the splitting of issues in class actions. As a result, the courts are permitted
to "treat common things in common and to distinguish the
34. 286 F.2d at 306.
35. 9 C. WIuoHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2391, at 302-03. The authors point out
that when a verdict is tainted on one issue when rendered by a first jury, new trial to a
second jury can be limited to that one issue. Id.; see Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref.
Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931).
36. 9 C. WRioHT & A. MILLER supra note 9, § 2391, at 303; seesupra notes 15 & 34 and
accompanying text.
37. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 154-65 and accompanying text.
39. 7A C. W iuor & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACnCE AND PROCEDURE § 1790, at 185
(1972 & Supp. 1982).
40. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
41. Id. at 44-45. A basic principle of equity mandates that a judgment can bind absent
class members only if they are adequately represented. In Hawberry the Supreme Court
found that the adverse interests of the absent members were not adequately represented and,
therefore, those members could not be bound by res judicata. Id.; see Recent Decisions,
Equity-Class Suits--Due Process, 29 GEO. L.J. 922 (1941).
42. 7A C. WRioHT & A. MILLER, upra note 39, at 185. The authors point out that the
Hansberry opinion was later employed by courts as a means to refuse class certification if
the class consisted of members with antagonistic interests. Id.
43. See Berry, Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure: The Imperativefor Compre-
hensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 299, 305 (1980).




Shortly after adoption of the 1966 amendments the court in Kronenberg
v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc.46 noted the new rule's provisions for flex-
ibility and innovation.47 Confronted with a unwieldy class and a variety
of misrepresentations in a securities fraud action, the court restructured
both the class and the issues. 48 The court noted the addition to rule 23 of
devices to aid in managing the action,49 and because of these devices, the
court determined that it was capable of dealing adequately with the com-
plexities of the case.50
Judge Frankel viewed the revision of rule 23 as "broad outline of gen-
eral policies and directions. . . . [The rule] confides to the district judges
a broad range of discretion." 51 By adding section (c)(4)(A) to rule 23,52
however, the drafters imposed a duty upon the courts not to dismiss the
class before making every effort to restructure the issues in order to meet
certification requirements.5 3 Dismissal of class claims is appropriate only
when complexity or prejudice "outweighs the advantage of common treat-
ment."'54 Justice Black, who dissented from the adoption of the 1966
amendments, objected to the restructuring power that rule 23 placed in the
hands of the district judges to manipulate class certification.55 He cau-
tioned that without legal standards to follow, judges could dismiss or re-
construct classes at will, thus exposing class members to unnecessary
dangers. 56
Defending rule 23's revision, Professor Miller approvingly notes the pro-
cedural arsenal available to district judges in subdivisions (c) and (d) of
the rule.57 He commends judicial recognition of certification as an explor-
atory process, observing that "[i]nstead of wielding a meat axe, courts in-
creasingly are operating with a scalpel."58 Another defender of the powers
granted by rule 23 has noted: "Practical procedural effects . . . ought to
45. Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 35 (5th Cir. 1968); see supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
46. 41 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
47. Id. at 44.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 45-46.
51. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 39
(1967). Judge Frankel further observed that "we've been challenged to piece out a huge
body of procedural common law by giving all the hard labor and creative imagination we
can muster ... ." Id.
52. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
53. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 39, § 1790, at 186-87.
54. Id. at 189.
55. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 383
U.S. 1029, 1035 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting from order of transmittal).
56. Id.; see also Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204,
1228 (1966).
57. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights.- Myth, Reality, and the "Class
Action Problem," 92 HARv. L. Rv. 664, 680 (1979). As a staunch defender of the amended
rule 23, Professor Miller espouses the conviction that the rule needs time to prove its effec-
tiveness, and that predictions of doom are premature. Id. at 693-94.
58. Id. at 680.
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govern. A satisfactory rule can only lay down broad guidelines. . . de-
pending upon the tradition and good sense of our judges to prevent
abuse."'59
Economy of judicial resources is one of the primary goals of class ac-
tions under rule 23(b)(3). 60 Many of the policy justifications supporting
bifurcation under traditional rule 42(b) procedure, including efficient dis-
position of cases and procedural convenience, are justifications for bifurca-
tion of (b)(3) class actions as well.61 Effective administration of (b)(3) class
actions will depend upon the frequent use of the bifurcating tool.
62
Although the bifurcating device in rule 23(c)(4)(A) is not limited to
(b)(3) class actions, separation of liability and damage issues is particularly
appropriate to (b)(3) actions where complicated damage issues are the
mainstay of the proceedings. The types of cases best suited for bifurcated
trials are those in which common questions such as fraud, conspiracy, or
negligence can be decided first, leaving individual proof of reliance or in-
jury to later trials.63 Unlike 23(b)(1) actions where plaintiffs seek one re-
covery, and damage determination is not difficult, or (b)(2) actions where
the claim to primarily injunctive relief negates the problem of unwieldy
class size, (b)(3) actions typically involve diverse claims bound only by
common questions and motivated by procedural convenience. Although
the damages sought by (b)(3) claimants are often individualized in both
character and amount, the liability issues are often inextricably linked.64
The availability of a restructuring device under rule 23(c)(4)(A) is of
particular significance in (b)(3) class actions because of the additional hur-
dles to certification that confront the (b)(3) class. In addition to the rule
23(a) prerequisites, 65 the drafters of the 1966 amendments conditioned
59. Weinstein, Revision ofProcedure." Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFFALO L.
REv. 433, 470 (1960).
60. According to the advisory committee's report, 23(b)(3) class actions, though not as
mandatory in nature as (b)(1) or (b)(2) suits, served to "achieve economies of time, effort,
and expense, and promote, uniformity as to persons similarly situated." FED. R. Civ. P. 23
advisory committee note.
61. See Berry, supra note 43, at 305. Berry notes, "Class procedure is supposed to be
designed to facilitate cost-spreading, to avoid repetitious, overlapping litigation, and to pro-
tect the less advantaged from intimidation." Id.
62. Frankel, supra note 51, at 47. Judge Frankel stated, "And I submit that a lively
awareness of this sensible device should serve to postpone or minimize some of the exces-
sively frightening complications that seem overwhelming from a threshold view of the case."
Id.
63. Id. at 43. Judge Frankel considers mass accidents, mass frauds, and antitrust viola-
tion actions among the types of suits amenable to separate trial. Id.; cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 23
advisory committee note. The committee indicates that mass accidents are ordinarily inap-
propriate for separate treatment of issues. Id.
64. See Miller, Problems in Administering Judicial Relief in Class Actions Under Federal
Rule 23(b)(3), 54 F.R.D. 501, 503-04 (1972).
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) provides:
Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions
of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representa-
tive parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the repre-
sentative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
19821
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
availability of (b)(3) class adjudication upon a showing of the predomi-
nance of common questions66 and the superiority of class treatment.67 In
order to determine that class adjudication is superior to other methods of
adjudication, rule 23(b)(3)(D) requires the court to assess "the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action. '68 Without
the availability of the bifurcating device, the obstacles to the class certifica-
tion in a 23(b)(3) action would permit the court to deny class status when-
ever the size, complexity, or remedial difficulties involved give the
appearance that common questions do not predominate, or that managea-
bility problems preclude a finding that class treatment is the superior
method of adjudication. Thus, bifurcation of issues under rule 23(c)(4)(A)
has taken on a new character. While bifurcation originated as a method of
controlling complex litigation already at trial, the separation of issues in a
(b)(3) action has evolved into a means of achieving class certification.
III. ESTABLISHING THE PREDOMINANCE REQUIREMENT
WITH RULE 23(c)(4)(A)
In attempting to achieve certification, the potential (b)(3) class must
overcome the preliminary obstacle of establishing that issues common to
its members predominate over those that are individual.69 The drafters of
the 1966 amendments assumed that the imposition of this additional re-
quirement upon the (b)(3) class would preserve the economies of the class
action.70 A (b)(3) class action is characteristically a damage action that
involves numerous individual proofs of causation and injury.71 The
proper method of determining predominance has led to numerous dis-
putes.72 If courts include damage determinations while weighing predomi-
nance in terms of the number of common issues against the number of
individual claims and issues, the scale will always tip in favor of a determi-
nation of nonpredominance.
In Green v. Wolf Corp. 3 the plaintiff sought certification of a (b)(3) class
in a suit that alleged a violation of section 1Ob-5 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.74 The court addressed the issue of whether the common issue
of violation predominated over the 2,200 individual questions of reliance
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The first clause of (b)(3) requires that "the court finds that
the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members. . . ." Id.
67. Id. The court must find "that a class action is superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Id.
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D). This provision is commonly referred to as the manage-
ability requirement.
69. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
70. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note.
71. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
72. See Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized 7het. Consumer Class Actions
and the Substance--Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 842, 861-63 (1974) (offering
numerous approaches to predominance determinations by class proponents and courts).
73. 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). The complaint alleged that the defendant employed de-
ception in three prospectuses, which inflated the price of the defendant's stock and led
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and damages.75 Finding that a separate trial on the issue of misrepresenta-
tion would be the most expeditious method of adjudication, 76 the court
concluded that the common issue of misrepresentation predominated,
77
and noted that the avoidance of multiple suits for a common wrong was
the precise function of the class action device.78 Despite the diverse indi-
vidual claims inherent in (b)(3) classes, the reality remains that issues com-
mon to the class, for example Wolf Corporation's misrepresentations, are
more expeditiously adjudicated on a classwide basis.79 The predominance
uestion is thus determined by a qualitative balancing process that weighs
e gravity and scope of a common issue, rather than on a quantitative
process that counts the number of common issues against the number of
individual questions. Courts have held that common issues predominate,
despite the fact that the individual questions outnumber common issues.80
Professor Landers has observed that some courts are refusing to struggle
with the interpretation of predominance, opting to employ what he terms
"a rough pragmatism." 8' He notes that if class treatment can dispose of a
good part of the litigation, the class action is appropriate.8 2- To attain this
pragmatic end, the courts certify the class on the common issues and post-
pone the other issues for separate trial83 by establishing "partial class ac-
tions." 84 Rule 23(c)(4) allows restructuring of the class membership by
providing the subclassing tool in rule 23(c)(4)(B). Subclassing a diverse
group of people with various and conflicting interests allows each subclass
to achieve certification and advance its claims in a separate trial. The par-
tial class action is also achieved by employing rule 23(c)(4)(A), which like
Green and approximately 2,200 class members to rely on the misstatements. 406 F.2d at
295.
75. 406 F.2d at 301. The court noted that defendant's argument that individual reliance
issues predominated would effectively negate class treatment of lOb-5 actions, since reliance
is always an element of the action. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 300.
78. Id.
79. See Berry, supra note 43, at 303 (despite class opponent attempts to flood the court
with uncommon issues, common questions may be efficiently resolved only on class basis).
80. See, e.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 977 (1969); Fogel v. Wolfgang, 47 F.R.D. 213, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The Fogel court
concluded that "Ja]side from damages, the only significant issue which might not be com-
mon to the class is 'reliance'. Efficiency will be served by allowing plaintiffs to litigate all the
complex issues common to the class, and requiring individual proofs of reliance and dam-
ages at a later stage." Id.
81. Landers, supra note 72, at 862.
82. Id.
83. See 7A C. WRIorT & A. MILLER, supra note 39, at 187; FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory
committee note. The committee points out that subdivision (c)(4)(A) recognizes that some
class actions may go forward only on particular issues. The committee stated further that
"in a fraud or similar case the action may retain its 'class' character only through the adjudi-
cation of liability to the class; the members of the class may thereafter be required to come in
individually and prove the amounts of their respective claims." Id.
84. 7A C. WRIoHT & A. MILLER, supra note 39, at 187. For examples of cases where
nartial class actions went forward on the common issues, reserving the damage questions for
ter treatment, see Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 538 F.2d 991 (3d Cir. 1976); Bing v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1973); American Trading & Prod. Corp. v.
Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
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rule 42(b), originated as a tool of economy.8 5 The difference, however, is
that this tool of economy now serves as a means to establish predomi-
nance. The courts now postpone the predominance question until after
they restructure the class membership through subclassing and
recharacterize the issues through bifurcation.
In Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp.8 6 the court used the subclassing and
bifurcating techniques of rule 23(c)(4) to overcome the predominance hur-
dle. Twenty-nine named plaintiffs, who were engaged in various seafood
occupations in the Chesapeake Bay and James River areas, filed a class
action,87 asserting that defendant's acts and omissions had polluted the
waters with Kepone deposits.88 The court found that in its original form
the class did not present a predominance of common questions.89 Rather
than dismiss the action, the court employed the subclassing technique of
rule 23(c)(4)(B) and then, pursuant to rule 23(c)(4)(A), restructured by bi-
furcating the issues of liability and damages.90 The bifurcation allowed
the newly formed subclasses to establish the defendant's liability to the
class as a whole, while postponing proof of damages until a later
proceeding.91
Defendants in (b)(3) class actions are quick to argue that the individual
issues outnumber those that are common. In many substantive contexts,
however, courts have held that to dismiss classes because of numerous in-
dividual injuries would preclude all (b)(3) class actions.92 One court
viewed the defendant's predominance argument as "an emasculation of
the vitality and pliability of the amended rule."' 93 Another court dis-
counted the argument primarily because an issue counting process would
mean the end of (b)(3) actions. 94 When the numerous individual claims
have been incidental to the weightier common issue, the class has been
allowed to proceed.95 By using rule 23(c)(4)(A) the courts have thus been
able to overcome the preliminary hurdle of predominance. Predominance
85. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note.
86. 85 F.R.D. 100 (E.D. Va. 1980).
87. Id. at 103. The class consisted of approximately 30,000 residents of Virginia and
Maryland who earned their livings "catching, taking, buying, selling, processing, packing,
packaging, or distributing" seafood. Id. at 104.
88. Id. at 103.
89. Id. at 104.
90. Id. at 111.
91. Id. at 113.
92. See Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 447 (5th Cir. 1973) (title VII class
action); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977
(1969) (securities fraud action); Shelter Realty Corp. v. Allied Maintenance Corp., 442 F.
Supp. 1087, 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), dismirsed without opinion, 578 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1978)
(private antitrust action); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 488 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), aftd,
464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972) (securities fraud action).
93. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 727 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
94. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977
(1969).
95. For example, see Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 448 (5th Cir. 1973).
One court concluded that "[t]he predominance requirement calls only for predominance, not
exclusivity, of common questions. There are many causes of action, e.g., securities frauds,
consumer injuries-for which each individual plaintiff must show individual damages in
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of common issues, however, is merely an initial hurdle. In order to justify
class treatment under rule 23(b)(3), a court must also determine that an-
other method of adjudication, with superior practical advantages, is not
available.96
IV. ESTABLISHING THE SUPERIORITY REQUIREMENT
USING RULE 23(c)(4)(A)
The predominant factor in determining whether a class action is supe-
rior is found in rule 23(b)(3)(D). 97 In order for class treatment to be supe-
rior, the court must evaluate the management difficulties and determine if
the action can be realistically maintained without straining judicial re-
sources. 98 Because (b)(3) class actions present such diverse claims, issues,
and defenses, and involve expenditure of vast sums of money and time,99
some courts have established criteria for weighing manageability. 100 Fac-
tors frequently considered include class size,' 10 significance of claims, 0 2
relief distribution problems, 0 3 and complexity of litigation.1°4 The coun-
tervailing economies of handling as much as possible of the complex case
in one proceeding prompt the courts whenever possible to structure the
action through rule 23(c)(4)(A) to achieve a manageable suit. The courts
must consider the burdens of separate suits, both in terms of their own
judicial resources and the resources of the class opponent.'0 5
Courts have used the superiority requirement to prevent certification of
order to prevail. This has not barred certification .... " Shelter Realty Corp. v. Allied
Maintenance Corp., 75 F.R.D. 34, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note.
97. Id. 23(b)(3)(D) provides: "The matters pertinent [in determining class action is su-
perior include]: (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action."
98. See Shelter Realty Corp. v. Allied Maintenance Corp., 75 F.R.D. 34, 38-39
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). The defendant argued that certifying the class would spawn thousands of
individual lawsuits that would not otherwise be brought and would lead to an unmanage-
able strain on the court. The court rejected this argument, stating that the claims ought to be
heard and the class action was the most economical way to hear them. Id. The court con-
cluded: "The threat of inundation comes from the prospect of individual, duplicative actions
rather than this single proceeding." Id. at 38.
99. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 143, at 34-35 (1977).
100. See Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1318, 1499 (1976);
62 CORNELL L. REV. 177, 186 (1976).
101. See In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 90-91 (9th Cir. 1974) (millions of plaintiffs
and over 600 defendants); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 599 (N.D. Ill.
1973) (over 17 million plaintiffs); City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 71
(D.N.J. 1971) (over six million plaintiffs and unknown number of transactions). But see
Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. America, Inc., [1975-2] Trade Cas. 60,534 (E.D. Pa. 1975), in
which the court bifurcated liability from damages and certified a class of 300,000 plaintiffs.
102. See In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 92 (9th Cir. 1974) (court denied class
certification where average claim was $2); Cochett v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D.
549 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (average claim equalled $1).
103. See Al Barnett & Sons v. Outboard Marine Corp., 64 F.R.D. 43, 55-56 (D. Del.
1974).
104. See Schaffner v. Chemical Bank, 339 F. Supp. 329, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); United
Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
105. See Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 624, 627 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
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(b)(3) classes when confronted with massive and complicated litigation, 106
and at least one commentator has been critical of dismissal under the supe-
riority requirement when it is based upon perceived management difficul-
ties. 10 7 The advisory committee suggested that an inquiry into the
superiority of class adjudication might involve an investigation of alternate
methods such as test or model cases and consolidation, 0 8 and has recom-
mended that the courts assess the relative advantages of these alternative
procedures. 109 In Pruitt v. Allied Chem Corp. lI0 the court disagreed with
the defendant's contention that numerous alternative methods existed that
would be more manageable than a class action,"' including individual
suits, joinder, intervention, consolidation for discovery, and the test case
methods." 2 Similarly, the court reasoned that consolidation would not be
superior because it would only provide "partial savings of parties' time
and expense."113 The court likewise rejected the test case method, 4 find-
ing it doubtful that any one plaintiff would be able to afford the costs of
the action or acquire consent of the other class members.' '5 Disposing of
these alternatives, the Pruitt court concluded that subclassing and bifur-
cating liability and damages streamlined an unmanageable suit into what
the court deemed the superior method of adjudication."l 6
Judge Frankel admonishes that, to administer (b)(3) class actions effi-
ciently, the bifurcating device of rule (c)(4)(A) "should serve to postpone
or minimize some of the excessively frightening complications that seem
overwhelming from a threshold view of the case."' 17 One court viewed the
bifurcating tool as a means to advance the policy of rule 23 to "eliminate
repetitive and burdensome litigation."' "18 By bifurcating liability and
damages, a court can await the outcome of a prior liability trial before
deciding how to provide relief to the individual class members."19 When
the court resolves liability in favor of the defendant, the action is dismissed
and the judgment is binding upon the class. The need for settlement of
106. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 169 (1974); Schaffner v. Chemical
Bank, 339 F. Supp. 329, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53
F.R.D. 45, 72-73 (D.N.J. 1971).
107. See Berry, .supra note 43, at 319.
108. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note. For an extended discussion of alter-
nate methods in the mass accident context, see Comment, Mass Accident Class Actions, 60
CALIF. L. REv. 1615, 1624;33 (1972).
109. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note.
110. 85 F.R.D. 100 (E.D. Va. 1980).
111. Id. at 115.
112. Id. The court disposed of the intervention and joinder alternatives as mere post-
ponements of the management problem, which ultimately would become burdensome on
the court and costly to the plaintiffs. Id.
113. Id. at 115-16.
114. Id. at 116; cf. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 474 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 885 (1974) (court employed test case approach, having plaintiff individually litigate the
substantive issues on behalf of entire class).
115. 85 F.R.D. at 116.
116. Id. at 118.
117. Frankel, supra note 51, at 47.
118. Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 624, 627 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
119. Miller, supra note 64, at 505.
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individual claims arises only when the class prevails on the liability
issue. 120
The decided advantage inherent in determining a defendant's liability
before requiring individual proof of damages is the conservation of re-
sources if a defendant is exonerated.121 Separate trials also provide the
defendants with a clear indication, early in the proceedings, of the extent
of their liability. 22 This in turn prevents defendants from engaging in in
terrorem 23 settlements when plaintiffs' claims are without merit. 24 Courts
that oppose denial of certification on the grounds of manageability have
concluded that managerial problems can be overcome with the procedural
tools available in rule 23.125 In Yaffee v. Powers 26 the First Circuit re-
versed the lower court's decertification on the basis of management
problems, and found that by basing a refusal of class certification upon
perceived management difficulties, the lower court contravened rule 23's
policy and neglected to employ the flexible powers available to cope with
the class suit.
According to one commentator, resolution of the conflicts inherent in
the determination of superiority hinges upon the decision of when to pro-
tect defendants from enormous damage exposure and when to prevent de-
fendants from taking refuge behind the class action prerequisites. 27 He
suggests three reasons why the prerequisites should not be used to prevent
the class action simply because the remedy will be difficult to manage:
(1) limitation of defendants' exposure to damage to only those plaintiffs
who suffer large injury; (2) prevention of plaintiffs' access to the court,
resulting in weakened incentive to sue; and (3) culmination in a "cloak and
dagger process" where both parties cannot achieve a fair result.128
The primary concern of the courts in determining manageability centers
on what will happen if the plaintiffs prevail on liability, necessitating indi-
vidual damage calculations and distribution. In Windham v. American
Brands, Inc. 29 a complex price-fixing class action was brought against cig-
120. Frankel, supra note 51, at 47. Addressing the unmanageable prospect of thousands
of litigants storming the courthouse doors, Judge Frankel noted, "If the common questions
have been aptly defined, there should be no need at an earlier stage to have all the 'individ-
ual class members before the court for discovery or any other purpose." Id.
121. Miller, supra note 64, at 505; see Berry, supra note 43, at 315, where the author
states, "wasteful squandering of resources on causation and damage proof' will be pre-
vented if the defendant prevails.
122. Berry, supra note 43, at 315.
123. Id. The literal meaning of "in terrorem" is 'in terror or warning; by way of threat."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 735 (5th ed. 1979).
124. Berry, supra note 43, at 315.
125. See Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 538 F.2d 991, 996 (3d Cir. 1976); Shelter
Realty Corp. v. Allied Maintenance Corp., 75 F.R.D. 34, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
126. 454 F.2d 1362, 1365 (1st Cir. 1972).
127. Berry, supra note 43, at 320; see Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 532 F.2d 10, 15 (7th
Cir.) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976).
128. Berry, supra note 43, at 320.
129. 68 F.R.D. 641 (D.S.C. 1975), aft'd, 565 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cer. de-
nied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978). The proposed class consisted of approximately 20,000 members,
and the claims involved thousands of sales over a four-year period. 68 F.R.D. at 648.
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arette manufacturers. In the trial court no attempt was made to bifurcate
the issues, and the court dismissed the class of tobacco growers as unman-
ageable. l30 The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court
abused its discretion by using management problems to refuse certifica-
tion, 31 and remanded for a separate trial on the violation issue as a means
to overcome the manageability obstacle.' 32 On rehearing, the Fourt Cir-
cuit en banc reversed this decision.' 33 The chief concerns of the en banc
court included the enormity of the damage exposure faced by defendants if
liability were found,' 34 the prospect of forced settlement, and the tremen-
dous judicial strain resulting from numerous damage mini-trials. 35 While
some courts have chosen to ignore the individual questions or have treated
damage calculation difficulties as irrelevant to certification, 136 other courts
have denied certification because the numerous damage questions render
the class unmanageable. 3 7
As a result of the remedial problems inherent in (b)(3) class damage
actions, commentators have proposed numerous alternatives to provide re-
lief in the event that the plaintiff class prevails on the liability issue.' 38
The courts may employ a broad range of available techniques, including
summary judgment procedures, damage calculations on a class-wide basis,
masters' determinations, and other administrative claims processing. 139
Courts have frequently employed a proof of claim procedure to ease the
damage proof problem. In this procedure each member of the class is in-
structed to complete within a specified time period a standardized ques-
tionnaire describing his injury. 40 A number of courts have proposed to
employ the concept of a fluid class recovery, whereby aggregate damages
130. 68 F.R.D. at 659.
131. Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 539 F.2d 1016, 1021-22 (4th Cir. 1976).
132. Id. at 1022.
133. 565 F.2d 59, 72 (4th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978).
134. 565 F.2d at 66.
135. Id. at 66-67.
136. See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 762 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
885 (1974); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977
(1969); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 101 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969).
137. Boshes v. General Motors, 59 F.R.D. 589, 600 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (30-40 million buyers
of G.M. automobiles alleging overpricing); see Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, 61 F.RD. 427
(W.D. Mo. 1973) (class of 4.5 million denied because of divergent individual damage
claims).
138. See Freeman, Current Issues in Class Litigation, 70 F.R.D. 251 (1976); Hinds, To
Right Mass Wrongs: A Federal Consumer Class Action Act, 13 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 776, 811-
16 (1976); Landers, supra note 72, at 866-80; Miller, supra note 64, at 506; Miller, Special
Damage Considerations in Class Action Situations, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 211, 214-18 (1980);
Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note 100, at 1517-36; Comment, Proof of
Damages, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 1049, 1054-62 (1974); Comment, Damages Distribution in Class
Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 448, 452-65 (1972).
139. See Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note 100, at 1517; infra notes
178-205 and accompanying text.
140. See Korn v. Franchard Corp., 50 F.R.D. 57, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), reversed and re-
mandedon other grounds, 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils,
Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 403-04 (S.D. Iowa 1968); Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44
F.R.D. 559, 577 (D. Minn. 1968); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43
F.R.D. 452, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
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are calculated and distribution is achieved through a proof-of-claim proce-
dure.141 One commentator suggests trying the damage issue only once,
with a single award to the class, followed by an administrative mechanism
to divide the lump sum recovery among the individual members.142
V. ADVERSE IMPLICATIONS OF SEPARATE TRIALS IN CLASS ACTIONS
One of the primary arguments against bifurcating liability and damages
in a massive (b)(3) damage action is the fact that, by doing so, the courts
are merely postponing the burdensome individual claims until liability is
determined.' 43  The Fourth Circuit in Windham v. American Brands,
Inc. 44 refused separate trials because of "fears that trying violation issues
first [would] merely postpone difficulties of individual proof and therefore
not eliminate management problems."' 145 The individual claims that are
merely postponed must eventually surface, and this will burden judicial
resources. ' 46
A second argument against bifurcating liability and damages addresses
the proposition that, faced with multiple claims of enormous damage ex-
posure, defendants will be forced into in terrorem settlements. 47 One
court has been critical of the use of the class action to impose settlement
pressure. 148 Commentators voice fears that class actions expose business
141. See Bebchick v. Public Util. Comm'n, 318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373
U.S. 913 (1963); West Virna v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
a§'d, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cr), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67
Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967). But see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973) (Eisen III), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). The
Second Circuit suggested that fluid recovery violated due process and was illegal. 479 F.2d
at 1018. The Supreme Court declined to rule on the subject, however, when it reviewed
Esen 111, 417 U.S. 156 ( 1974); see also Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59 (4th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978). The court rejected the fluid recovery concept.
565 F.2d at 72 (citing Eisen 111, 479 F.2d at 1018); accord Lohse v. Dairy Comm'n, [1977-2]
Trade Cas. 61,805, at 73,339 (D. Nev. 1977) (citing Eisen III).
142. Comment, Manageability o/Notice and Damage Calculation in Consumer Class Ac-
tions, 70 MICH. L. REV. 338, 360 (1971).
143. See Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust
Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1971).
144. 565 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978); see supra notes 129-35
and accompanying text.
145. Berry, supra note 43, at 338.
146. Handler, supra note 143, at 8. Another commentator warns: "The commendable
social policy of providing a judicial remedy for vindicating or denying great numbers of
small claims cannot override the important policy of protecting the judicial process itself
from collapse through the sheer mass of unfounded and unbridled litigation." Schuck, An
Overview of Class Actions, 70 F.R.D. 289, 309 (1976).
147. See Handler, supra note 143, at 8-9, where the author observes: "Any device which
is workable only because it utilizes the threat of unmanageable and expensive litigation to
compel settlement is not a rule of procedure--it is a form of legalized blackmail." But see
Berry, supra note 43, at 315; supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
148. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 62 F.R.D. 124 (E.D. Pa. 1973). The court held:
Certifying class actions, when everyone recognizes that the individual claims
can never be fully litigated, with the constitutionally guaranteed right of trial
by jury, because of the prohibitive costs of litigation, does not lend itself to "a
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy" and violates the purpose of




defendants to a "financial death sentence,"' 49 from having to pay large
settlements without a judicial determination of causation and damages. 50
At least one commentator, however, suggests a strong argument against the
fear of forced settlement as an adverse consequence of class certifica-
tion.151 He notes that the defendant's superior financial situation puts the
decision of settlement in his own hands.152 His argument concludes that
"frequent settlements do not reflect legalized blackmail, but rather, a hard
look at both the realities of the case and defendants' litigation posture
.... To give defendants immunity from class actions because most will
be settled. . . is without apparent basis in procedure or policy."'
1 5 3
Separating the trials of liability and damages gives rise to a third major
consideration. Heated debate exists over the propriety of bifurcation in
light of the defendant's constitutional right to jury trial under the seventh
amendment. 54 If trials are split to overcome the superiority requirement
and achieve manageability, does the defendant have a right to hear proof
and rebut evidence from each individual plaintiff? One commentator
urges that the Constitution mandates such a right.'"- Others suggest that
bifurcation preserves constitutional rights of the defendant and allows him
the benefit of final, binding adjudication of class rights in his favor should
he prevail on the merits.' 56 A critic of the constitutional argument ob-
serves that "if defendants have the right to require each class member to
come forward. . . the right to impose such a requirement is both an invi-
tation to the defendant to keep his ill-gotten gains and an inducement to
continue such conduct in the future."' 157
Although there is a staunch opposition to bifurcation based on the sev-
enth amendment right to jury trial, trying the issues separately to the same
jury is not violative of the Constitution.158 The more imposing problem is
whether a defendant's right to a jury trial is violated if the separate issues
149. Handler, supra note 143, at 9.
150. Berry, supra note 43, at 319.
151. Landers, supra note 72, at 881.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976) provides: "Such rules [FRCP]
shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall preserve the right of trial
by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution."
See Handler, supra note 143, at 7.
155. Handler, supra note 143, at 7. "[Slince the seventh amendment guarantees defend-
ants a constitutional right to a jury trial with respect to each damage claim asserted, at some
point there will have to be either a massive trial lasting for years or a multitude of mini-trials
.Id. at 7-8 (footnote omitted).
156. See Hinds, supra note 138, at 811; see also Freeman, supra note 138, at 266. Com-
pare Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, 61 F.R.D. 427 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (finding individual evi-
dence presentation on damages necessary) with Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc.,
[1975-2] Trade Cas. 160,534 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (rejecting defendant's argument that individual
proofs were necessary).
157. Landers, supra note 72, at 867.
158. See, e.g., Moss v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 23, 27 (6th Cir. 1965); Brocik v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 277 F. Supp. 210, 211 (E.D. Wis. 1967); Shoreham Village,
Inc. v. Bush Constr. Co., 185 F. Supp. 534, 537 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
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are heard by separate juries. 159 In the context of retrial, the Supreme
Court has established that issues may be retried by a separate jury. 60
When considering bifurcated trials of separate issues, one court has found
that a single jury is not mandatory, 161 while another has left the separate
jury issue open. 16 2 In In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation163 the court
directed separate trials on liability and damages and rejected defendant's
argument that a single jury was mandated. 164 Strong precedent is emerg-
ing for the proposition that in complex litigation liability and damage is-
sues may be tried before separate juries. 65 Finally, opponents urge that
by bifurcating liability and damages in certain types of actions, the courts
are using procedural rules to change substantive law,166 and that this
change is prohibited by the Rules Enabling Act. 167 The argument is made
that courts should not use the procedural devices in rule 23 to modify the
manner of proof for a specific substantive cause of action. 68 For example,
in securities fraud litigation, in order to prove damages due to violations of
section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act169 and the SEC's rule
lOb-5,170 a plaintiff must allege misrepresentation or material omission,
reliance, and damage.17' In determining if common issues predominate
over individual questions, 72 a court must decide whether to certify the
class on the common issue of materiality of the misrepresentations, while it
postpones the individual proof of reliance for the damage phase of the
bifurcated trial. A decision to certify the class in this instance would serve
to permit a procedural rule to have "direct impact on the definition of the
159. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2391; Note, ProposedRaule 23: Class
Actions Rectass#Fed, 52 VA. L. Rnv. 629, 643 n.44 (1965).
160. Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498-99 (1931).
161. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 183 F. Supp. 577, 585 (N.D. 111.
1960).
162. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 286 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1961). Although
the court did not allow bifurcation because the issues were inseparably interwoven, the court
did hold that there may be circumstances in which separate juries would suffice. Id.
163. 70 F.R.D. 23 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 528 F.2d (2d Cir. 1975).
164. 70 F.R.D. at 28-29; cf. Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 415 (5th Cir. 1964)
(validity, tide, infringement, and damages may be separately tried in patent and copyright
cases), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962 (1965); LoCicero v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 52 F.R.D. 28,
30 (E.D. La. 1971) (damages and liability may be separately tried in antitrust case).
165. See Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 550 F.2d 860 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 431
U.S. 933 (1977); Arthur Young & Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 549 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
166. Handler, supra note 143, at 6-7; Landers, supra note 72, at 865-66; Simon, Class
Action-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 386 (1972). Full discussion of
this area, although pertinent to the subject of bifurcation, is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. See generaly Handler, supra; Landers, supra; Simon, supra; Developments the
Law-Class Actions, supra note 100, at 1504-16; Comment, The Impact of Class Actions on
Rule 10-5, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 337, 337-38, 345-47 (1971).
167. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976); see supra note 154.
168. Handler, supra note 143, at 7; Landers, upra note 72, at 866.
169. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
170. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
171. See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 300-01 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
977 (1969). See generaly Comment, supra note 166.
172. See supra notes 69-96 and accompanying text.
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substantive basis for liability."' 73
Nevertheless, courts have held that separate trial on the matter of reli-
ance is proper.' 74 Prior to a determination of predominance, at least two
courts have resolved the reliance issue on the merits. 75 The advisory com-
mittee suggests that class action compatibility with the substantive law is
not determinative; rather, class actions are appropriate if litigatory econo-
mies result.' 76 Assuming the policies behind the substantive law are to
deter wrongdoing, class ictions are often the most effective means to ac-
complish deterrence on a widespread basis. 77
VI. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
If the courts are to use the bifurcating tool effectively in class actions,
they must have an economical and fair means of handling the damage
phase of the litigation in the event that the class prevails on the liability
issue. No recorded class action has been litigated to a conclusion before a
jury.' 78 This may be attributed to the fact that once a defendant is found
liable, he usually settles before the trial on damages.' 79 Nevertheless, the
possibility still exists that settlement will not occur. Thus, the courts must
develop a manageable method of dispensing damages to individual
plaintiffs.
A method that the courts have tried with some success is the appoint-
ment of a special master pursuant to rule 53.180 The master processes
claims, determines class membership, and assesses the amount of damages
due to each plaintiff.'8 ' For example, in Switzer Brothers, Inc. v. Lock-fin182 the trial court found that the defendants had violated antitrust
173. Landers, supra note 72, at 866. Another area in which this argument is broadly
recognized is antitrust law when treble-damage class actions are brought under § 4 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Under § 4 a plaintiff must prove both
injury in his business or property caused by defendant's malfeasance and and dollar amount
of the injury. See Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1978). In Ala-
bama the defendants argued that by separating liability and damages, the substantive ele-
ments of an antitrust violation would be changed. Id. at 317. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
certification of the statewide class, but held that bifurcation could not diminish the substan-
tive requirement that plaintiff prove some injury before liability could be found. Id.; see
also Handler, supra note 143, at 7 (substantive problem under the Clayton Act); Develop-
ments in the Law--Class Actions, supra note 100, at 1507-10 (substantive problems with
bifurcation in antitrust cases dealing with franchise "tying").
174. See Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206, 1212-13 (2d Cir. 1972); Green v. Wolf
Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); Fogel v. Wolfgang,
47 F.R.D. 213, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
175. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905-08 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976); Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279, 288-91, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
176. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note; see Developments in the Law-Class
Actions, supra note 100, at 1505.
177. Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note 100, at 1502-06.
178. See Becker, The Class Action Conflict: A 1976 Report, 75 F.R.D. 167, 190 (1976).
179. Id.
180. FED. R. Civ. P. 53; see, e.g., Eastern Fireproofing Co. v. United States Gypsum Co.,
50 F.R.D. 140 (D. Mass. 1970).
181. See Foster v. City of Detroit, 405 F.2d 138, 146-47 (6th Cir. 1968); Hayden v. Chal-
fant Press, Inc., 281 F.2d 543, 544 (9th Cir. 1960).
182. 1961 Trade Cas. 70,166 (N.D. Il1. 1961).
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laws' 83 and appointed a master to discover the extent of damages suf-
fered.' 84 The Seventh Circuit held that the procedure of reference to a
master was proper.'8 5 The same procedure was approved in Union Car-
bide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 18 6 where the Tenth Circuit allowed the ap-
pointment of a special master to assess the individual damages and to
assist in damage distribution after a determination of liability.'
8 7
As early as 1920, in the leading case of Ex parte Peterson l88 the
Supreme Court approved the reference to a special master in jury cases
that involve complex calculations, accounts, and voluminous evidence.18 9
The Supreme Court ruled that reference to a special master did not violate
the seventh amendment because the amendment does not prohibit the use
of new forms of practice and procedure. 190 The master gathered evidence
from the parties and submitted a report deemed prima facie evidence for
the jury to consider.' 91
United States District Judge William Becker construed the Peterson case
to mean that the special master procedure allows the original jury to be
recalled to hear the master's report.' 92 When the Pruitt court faced the
problem of potential damage calculations, it ruled that the special master
procedure was to be used if a damage phase of the trial became neces-
sary.193 Using Judge Becker's approach, the court held that the original
jury would be temporarily excused after its liability verdict, the master
would prepare his calculations of individual damages, and the jury would
be recalled to render judgment on the master's report. 194 The Pruitt deci-
sion raises some practical problems. In Pruitt the damage calculations for
approximately 30,000 class members, with claims varying in amount and
character, 95 will consume a considerable length of time. If discovery is
postponed as to each individual's damage claim until after the jury deter-
mines that the defendant is liable,' 96 can the court realistically expect to
extend jury duty over an indeterminable time? If discovery of damages is
not postponed, but commences at the outset of the liability trial, the judi-
cial system will lose the economic benefits of the bifurcating tool.
97
For purposes of preserving both judicial economy and pragmatic treat-
183. Id. at 78,665.
184. Id.
185. 297 F.2d 39, 47-48 (7th Cir. 1961).
186. 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1962).
187. Id. at 589.
188. 253 U.S. 300 (1920).
189. Id. at 313; see also LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259 (1957) (detailed
accounting to calculate damage amounts may be referred to master).
190. 253 U.S. at 309-10.
191. Id. at 311; see Connecticut Importing Co. v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 42 F. Supp.
225, 227 (D. Conn. 1940).
192. Becker, supra note 178, at 190.
193. Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 100, 117 (E.D. Va. 1980).
194. Id. (citing Becker, supra note 178, at 190).
195. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.




ment of juries, the special master's report must be submitted to a separate
jury.' 98 Although concern exists that such a procedure would violate the
seventh amendment, 199 precedent can be found that holds such a proce-
dure not violative of constitutional rights. In Eastern Fireproofing Co. v.
United States Gypsum Co. 200 the court on a jury verdict entered an inter-
locutory liability judgment on antitrust violations201 and instructed a spe-
cial master to determine the damage issues. 20 2 After conducting damage
hearings, the master submitted his findings to the court.20 3 The Eastern
Fireproofing court proceeded to the second phase of the trial with a similar
but different jury, deeming the process not violative of the seventh amend-
ment.2°4 Two more recent antitrust cases have tried the damage phase of
the trial to a different jury.20 5 In both cases the defendants apparently did
not raise the seventh amendment issue, and the Fifth Circuit did not ad-
dress it. In Arthur Young & Co. v. US. District Court2°6 the Ninth Circuit
directly stated that trial to a single jury is not an absolute constitutional
right. 20 7 In the (b)(3) class action, the complexity and time involved in the
master procedure will necessitate separate juries for each phase of the trial.
VII. CONCLUSION
The growing complexity of litigation has compelled a reconsideration of
the traditional mode of trial procedure in class actions. The courts have
responded by restructuring the complicated actions through rule 42(b) bi-
furcation, separating the trials in progress into more manageable partial
actions. Through rule 23(c)(4)(A), bifurcation has emerged in the (b)(3)
class action context as a means to achieve both certification and judicial
economy. Treating the issues of liability and damages separately, the
courts can more readily overcome the prerequisites of predominance and
manageability. The bifurcating device permits the courts to postpone the
calculation and distribution of damages until a later proceeding, which
seldom occurs due to settlement.
By referring the damage issues to a special master, the court will not be
crushed by hordes of individual damage claimants storming the court-
house doors if settlement efforts fail. The special master can process the
198. See Freeman, supra note 138, at 268.
199. See supra notes 154-65 and accompanying text.
200. 50 F.R.D. 140 (D. Mass. 1970).
201. Id. at 141.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Freeman, supra note 138, at 268; see Hosie v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 282 F.2d 639,
642-44 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); O'Donnell v. Watson Bros. Transp.
Co., 183 F. Supp. 577, 585 (N.D. 11. 1960); 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2391.
205. Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir. 1974); Terrell v. Household
Goods Carriers' Bureau, 494 F.2d 16, 18 (5th Cir. 1974).
206. 549 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
207. 549 F.2d at 692-93. The court concluded that "[a]ssuming the first trial is heard and
the class issues determined by one jury, as had been requested by the defendants, we per-
ceive no absolute bar, constitutional or otherwise, to resolution of any remaining issues
before either the same or a second jury." Id. at 693.
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claims, make factual determinations of the often voluminous material, and
submit his findings to the court. Discovery on individual damage claims
may be postponed until a preliminary finding of liability occurs, thus ful-
filling the bifurcation policy of economy. When the damage phase of the
trial begins, a separate jury can be summoned to dispose of the damage
issues. Employment of this method will neither violate the mandate of the
seventh amendment nor effect a deleterious change in the substantive law.
Through this procedure the defendant can be assured of an accurate deter-
mination of damages; the plaintiff can be assured a remedy; and the court
can be assured the time necessary to conduct its judicial functions
effectively.

